INTRODUCTION
Recent events have intensified the battle between those who fear "selling the Russians the rope they will hang us with" 1 and those who accuse the Reagan administration of waging "economic warfare" against the Soviet Union. 2 For much of 1987 and 1988, government officials and commentators have been debating how to withhold sensitive technology from potential foes of the U.S. while allowing U.S. exporters to succeed in world markets. Some have stressed that the West's qualitative edge in defense technology is slipping 3 and have pointed angrily to recent spectacular failures in the enforcement of multilateral export controls 4 as examples of what export control "reform" will achieve. Others have emphasized our deteriorating balance of trade, especially in high-technology products, 5 and have blamed autarkic and capricious export licensing Amendments Act of 1985 (1985 EAAA), 13 Congress explicitly balanced trade promotion and national security objectives by weighing the roles of the trade-oriented Department of Commerce (Commerce) and the security-oriented Department of Defense (DoD) in the national security export control process. The EAA had lapsed in 1983,14 and the House and Senate bills to renew it differed on one important point: whether DoD should have power to review and veto requests to export high-technology items to "non-controlled" (i.e., free-world) 15 countries. The Senate bill explicitly authorized such DoD review, 16 but the House refused to insert a like provision into its bill.1 7 The controversy ended in an unstable compromise when the President directed that DoD undertake review. Congress, satisfied that some decision had been made, left the 1985 EAAA silent on the matter. 8 Two years later, the 100th Congress, still struggling to balance policy objectives in export controls, decided to take action before the EAA's scheduled expiration in September 1989. 19 The House and Senate again differed on whether DoD should review applications for free-world hightechnology exports, 20 but this time the House took the offensive, seeking to legislate away the DoD review ordered by the President in 1985. 21 In the end, the House failed to secure inclusion of its provision in the 1988 OTCA. Instead, the OTCA blends Congress's continued refusal to amend the key statutory provision on DoD free-world export license re- (defining "controlled countries"). "Free-world," "non-controlled-country," and "West-West" denote exports to countries other than those that the EAA defines as "controlled."
16. See S. 979, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(5)-(7), 130 CONG. REc view, EAA section 10(g), 2 2 with legislative history that acknowledges, without resolving, the question of how much DoD license review the EAA really authorizes. The answer to that question affects the legality of the President's 1985 order. 23 This Note 24 addresses DoD's role in national security export controls 25 on "dual-use" goods, 26 17-28 (1984) (arguing that the U.S. lacks extraterritorial jurisdiction to impose export controls).
In contrast, most books and articles published since the 1985 EAAA's enactment focus on national security controls; many of them mention the section 10(g) issue analyzed here. For authorities, not cited elsewhere in this Note, that discuss U.S. export controls since the 1985 EAAA, see 26. "Dual-use" items are commercial goods, technologies, and data that could make a significant, but indirect, contribution to a potential foe's military capabilities. These items are the focus of the EAA, and hence of this Note. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 5, at 80-82 (explaining characteristics and regulation of dual-use items EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT policy aspects, legislative history, and constitutionality of the "section 10(g) issue," the Note:
(1) sketches the history of the EAA and the export licensing process that it implements; (2) reviews the events and debate that led to the 1985 EAAA's position on DoD review of free-world export license applications; This Note stresses the costs and confusion produced by the ambiguity of EAA section 10(g), and tries to resolve the confusion by clarifying the statutory and constitutional authority for DoD review.
I. HISTORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT CONTROLS
U.S. peacetime export controls on dual-use items emerged in the late 1940s, when the U.S. and its NATO allies were beginning to rely on superior military technology to offset the Soviet Union's quantitative strengths. 2 8 The controls found expression in the Export Control Act of 1949,29 which reflected a policy of "economic containment. ' [Vol. 1988:785 time, the U.S. enjoyed a near-monopoly on advanced technology l and thus was able to maintain the kinds of broad controls imposed during World War 11.32 Those controls imposed unilateral checks on goods and technologies that the U.S. alone had, and vigorously restricted the reexport of such goods. 3 3 Realizing that its allies could undermine U.S. export controls by freely exporting their own sensitive goods, the U.S. secured the allies' cooperation through the informal Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), formed in 1949. 34 In addition, under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act), 35 Congress promised to cut off all economic aid to any country that leaked controlled items. 36 Two decades later, after multiple extensions of the Export Control In the late 1970s, recognizing that the hortatory 1969 EAA had accomplished little permanent decontrol, 42 U.S. exporters importuned Congress for further changes. 43 A sweeping amendment in 1979 addressed their concerns. 44 The Export Administration Act of 1979 (1979 EAA) made both symbolic changes, such as a "Declaration of Policy" that put a priority on exporters' needs 45 and new provisions for exporters to make their opinions known, 46 and substantive changes, including limits on the scope of goods 47 and technologies 48 controlled.
Despite these liberalizations, neither the 1969 or 1979 amendments, nor the 1985 EAAA, changed certain prominent features of the national security export control scheme. These features include:
(1) exemption of the rulemaking and enforcement process from the judicial review requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act; 49 (2) short duration of each EAA reenactment, which gives Congress frequent opportunities to rethink its earlier policy judgments; 50 and (3) broad delegation to the President of authority to shape, administer, and enforce an export licensing regime. 5 [Vol. 1988:785 Moreover, the mechanics of U.S. national security export controls 53 have remained stable since the inception of "economic containment" in the 1940s. 54 
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authorized DoD to review export license applications for "any country to which exports are controlled for national security purposes. '56 In practice, DoD reviewed export licenses for Soviet bloc destinations only; this practice reflected Commerce and DoD's shared belief that section 10(g)'s language had the same meaning as the phrase "controlled country" used elsewhere in the EAA. 5 7 In mid-1981, however, as part of a broad crackdown in the administration and enforcement of export controls, 58 DoD began to claim that section 10(g) authorized it to review applications for free-world export licenses. In making this claim, it sought to check applications for risks of diversion (i.e., unauthorized reexport). Defense determines that the export of such goods or technology will make a significant contribution, which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States, to the military potential of any such country, to recommend to the President that such export be disapproved.
(2) . . .Whenever a license or other authority is requested for [an] export to any country to which exports are controlled for national security purposes..., the Secretary [of Commerce] shall notify the Secretary of Defense of such request, and the Secretary may not issue any license or other authority pursuant to such request before the expiration of the period within which the President may disapprove such export. The Secretary of Defense .... not later than 30 days after notification of the request, shall-(A) recommend to the President that he disapprove any request for the export of the goods or technology involved to the particular country... ;
(B) notify the Secretary [of Commerce] that he would recommend approval subject to specified conditions; or (C) recommend to the Secretary that the export of goods or technology be approved. If the President notifies the Secretary [of Commerce], within 30 days after receiving a recommendation from the Secretary of Defense, that he disapproves such export, no license or other authority may be issued for the export of such goods or technology to such country.
i4)j Whenever the President exercises his authority under this subsection to modify or overrule a recommendation made by the Secretary of Defense ....
the President shall promptly transmit to the Congress a statement indicating his decision, together with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. Id. (emphasis added). The text will refer to this provision as "section 10(g)."
56. Id. § 10(g)(1), (2), 93 Stat. at 527. 57. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing "controlled countries" (IVL) 6 0 applications for most free-world destinations. This arrangement changed slightly in March 1984, when the President "affirmed" it6l and also gave DoD "authority in principle" to review distribution licenses for the same products and destinations. 6 2 Under the M.O.U., 63 Commerce initially notifies DoD that it has received an application in one of the agreed-upon categories and provides an abstract of the application's contents. DoD has one week to request that Commerce send it the license application (with supporting documentation). After Commerce sends the application, DoD must make a recommendation within twenty-two days, or it loses the right to comment on the application. The twenty-two-day "clock" stops, however, if DoD requests further documentation from Commerce. If DoD recommends license disapproval, it must tell Commerce its reasons "with specificity." Commerce simultaneously reviews applications sent to DoD. If Commerce and DoD disagree, they must refer the application within ten days to a Technology Transfer Steering Group (TTSG) that comprises the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration (probably the Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration after October 1, 1987), 64 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, and the Deputy National Security Advisor. If deadlocked itself, the TTSG can refer the matter to the President. 65 Two government reports that influenced the 1983-1985 debates on the EAA's reauthorization and amendment 66 explored DoD's expanding role in export license review. A 1984 General Accounting Office (GAO) report 67 found Commerce's initial review to be a frequent source of needless delay and excess staffing 68 and recommended that DoD's review precede Commerce's in order to increase the focus on DoD's recommendations. 69 The GAO regarded DoD's review as an indispensable part of the process. 70 EXPORT ADMINISTRATION A CT study in 198371 took a different view in its discussion of the policy options facing the 98th Congress. 72 Though the OTA mentioned making DoD the primary licensing authority as one option, it noted that such a move would serve national security ends only, and not the goals of export licensing efficiency, foreign policy, or trade promotion. 73 In sum, the OTA said, Congress faced a choice: to change export control policy radically, or to equivocate. 74
B. Developments During the Ninety-Eighth and Ninety-Ninth
Congresses.
The 1979 EAA's expiration in 198375 gave the 98th Congress an opportunity to change the state of affairs under section 10(g), sparking a battle over what change was desirable. In his EAA reauthorization bill (S. 979), which the Senate passed in March 1984,76 Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah) proposed amending EAA section 10(g) to make DoD's power to review free-world export license applications explicit. 77 The House's already-passed reauthorization bill (H.R. 3231) contained no such amendment, and throughout the 1984 conference committee discussions the House maintained that "continued Commerce responsibility for decisions on free-world license applications... is preferable to formal review by other Departments over free-world licenses. ' 
A. Congressional Post-Mortems.
Even as they were passing the 1985 EAAA, Congressmen and Senators struggled to explain their decision to leave section 10(g) unchanged "as a result" of the President's January 1985 directive. 8 7 Senator Garn, who favored DoD free-world license review, was quick to stress two sources of authority for such review: (1) the unchanged language of section 10(g), which, he said, "preserved" DoD's authority to review export licenses 8 8 for "any country to which exports are controlled for national security purposes," 8 9 and (2) the President's independent authority to order such review, as exercised in his directive. 90 1985) ), gave applicants the right to respond to negative recommendations on their license requests.
87 [Vol. 1988:785 interprets section 10(g) of the Export Administration Act as amended by [S. 883] as providing no authority to the Secretary of Defense for reviewing proposed exports to countries other than controlled countries. In other words, the Department of Defense review of proposed exports of goods and technology to countries other than controlled countries would be illegal under the Export Administration Act of 1985.
3
Angered by DoD's continuing review of licenses for free-world exports and the resulting delays suffered by exporters, 94 Congressman Bonker has even suggested that exporters sue the executive branch for its noncompliance with the EAA. 95 The following two sections evaluate Congressmen Bonker and Zschau's claim that the 1985 EAAA precludes DoD review of free-world export licenses, as well as their implicit claim that continued execution of the January 1985 presidential directive violates the Constitution. 95. See, e.g., id. at 146 (statement of Rep. Bonker) ("[I]f the... executive branch[ ] is not carrying out the law as Congress intended, then somebody ought to be able to bring it to court."); see also Bonker Outlines Plans Following EAA Bill, Suggests Court Suit Over DoD Review Move, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 952 (July 24, 1985) (discussing Rep. Bonker's proposal that someone sue executive branch). Congressman Bonker has not elaborated the theory that might underlie such a suit, but he would probably claim both that continued DoD free-world license review violates section 10(g) as clarified by 1983-1985 legislative history, see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text, and that the presidential directive is unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine, see infra notes 121, 123-24, and accompanying text. Apparently, no exporters have followed Congressman Bonker's suggestion. See April 1986 Hearing. supra note 27, at 146 (statement of Rep. Bonker) ("Unfortunately I can't find anybody in the private sector who is willing to take on the executive branch . . . Congressman Bonker's argument against DoD's current role premises that section 10(g)'s phrase "country to which exports are controlled for national security purposes" 96 has always meant the same thing as "controlled country. '97 Bonker cites the lack of any material amendment in 1985 as proof that DoD's review authority is still limited to controlled-country exports. 98 Senators Garn and Heinz, on the other hand, believe that the 1979 EAA's section 10(g) 99 empowered DoD to review export license requests for all destinations subject to any national security controls. 1 0 0 In their view, the fact that the Senate proposed an amendment to correct the House's errant reading of the section, but dropped the amendment when the President solved the problem, detracts nothing from the 1979 language's meaning. 
Id.
(1) The Congress finds that the defense posture of the United States may be seriously compromised if the Nation's goods and technology are exported to a controlled country without an adequate and knowledgeable assessment being made to determine whether export of such goods and technology will significantly increase the military capability of such country ....
(2) ... Whenever a license or other authority is requested for the export of such goods or technology to any controlled country, the appropriate export control office or agency to whom such request is made shall [forward the request to the Secretary of Defense for his recommendation].
(4) As used in this subsection-DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1988:785 tive history of that amendment 1 0 5 make clear, the amendment authorized DoD to review controlled-country export licenses only. In 1979, the 96th Congress altered the 1974 language that confined DoD's review to controlled-country exports. 1 0 6 Some passages in the legislative history accommodate the view that this revision indicated a shift in congressional intent.107 The committee report 10 8 on the Senate bill that formed the basis of the 1979 EAA, 1 0 9 however, stressed that the 96th Congress intended to make no substantive change to the 1974 provision. 110 Despite the mystery surrounding Congress's rationale for overhauling section 10(g), the relevant House Report "1I and the floor debates 1 2 confirm that the 1979 EAA continued to limit DoD's review authority to controlledcountry exports. This state of affairs prevailed until the 1983-1985 reauthorization battle, which obscured the congressional intent regarding section 10(g). That the Senate's policy choice prevailed in 1985 by virtue of the President's directive 1 3 weakens Congressman Bonker's argument that the EAA means today what it meant in 1974 and 1979. Bonker must also explain why "controlled country" 114 and "country to which exports are controlled for national security purposes"I I 5 -phrases juxtaposed in one Export Administration Act-should mean the same thing. 116 Senators Garn and Heinz, in contrast, must respond to the argument that if "country to which exports are controlled for national security purposes" already had a congressionally ordained meaning different from that of "controlled country," the Senate in 1984 would not have pressed for a change that appeared more like a substantive amendment than a mere "clarification." 1 17
Neither side's legislative history argument gains much from the fact that executive action finally persuaded the 99th Congress to leave section 10(g) alone. 1 18 Pressured to reauthoize the EAA and seeing no prospect of agreement on a change to section 10(g), Congress used the 1985 directive as a welcome invitation to drop the subject. Statements in the Congressional Record reflect no consensus on the existing statutory basis for DoD free-world license review, 119 [Vol. 1988:785 C. Constitutionality of the Presidential Directive.
The President's January 1985 directive broke a two-year congressional deadlock and formalized DoD's practice of free-world license review. In view of the 1985 EAAA's ambiguity, however, the directive may not provide sufficient authority for DoD's current role. Congressman Bonker thinks that the directive is clearly insufficient authority for such a role. 12 1 His claim that DoD's free-world license review program is illegal raises the issue whether the President has authority to control exports when Congress is indifferent or opposed.
If pressed, the Attorney General most likely would defend the directive as an exercise of the President's independent power as "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations."' 122
Opponents of the directive would stress Congress's power to regulate foreign commerce. 123 They would contend that the subordinate character of the President's foreign affairs power' 24 prevents him from ordering a controversial change in export administration without congressional approval.
In determining the validity of independent presidential action, the to impound steel mills during a nationwide strike, the Steel Seizure Case majority noted that "[t]he President's power, if any, ... must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself." 1 27 In a concurring opinion intended to draw the borders between executive and legislative power, 128 Justice Jackson proposed to judge presidential assertions of residual power by "their disjunction or conjunction with [the will] of Congress." 129 He split the conceivable situations into three groups:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum.... [and is] supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation ....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority .... Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb .... 130 Although each side would claim that section 10(g)'s wording reflects an "express or implied" congressional endorsement of its position,' 3 ' most courts 132 and commentators would note Congress's "inertia," or its "quiescence," on the section 10(g) issue. 133 The courts therefore would analyze the 1985 presidential directive under Justice Jackson's second category: the directive's validity would depend "on a consideration of all the circumstances which might shed light on the views of the Legislative Branch toward such action," 134 including Congress's withdrawal from the section 10(g) issue in 1985. [Vol. 1988:785 Although the 98th and 99th Congresses failed to amend section 10(g) as the Senate wanted, a Steel Seizure Case review of legislative history from 1974 to 1985 would probably shore up the presidential directive. 1 35 Were it not for the President's action, the Senate and House might still be deadlocked over a bill like Senator Garn's in the 98th Congress.' 3 6 Both the House conference report on the 1985 EAAA 137 and statements on the Senate floor 138 credit the directive with ending the debate over section 10(g). Furthermore, despite Congressmen Bonker and Zschau's belief in the directive's illegality, 1 39 the House passed the 1985 EAAA,14 0 which at least indirectly legitimated President Reagan's order. That order is the clearest edsting authority for DoD's controversial freeworld license review program.
IV. POLICY ANALYSES OF DoD FREE-WORLD EXPORT LICENSE REVIEW SINCE 1985
Partly because of its questionable legal pedigree,' 4 ' DoD's freeworld export license review program has attracted sharp criticism since 1985. Furthermore, several authorities have cited long delays in licensing, lost sales, and recent export control lapses as symptoms of a more general problem with interagency license review under the EAA. Some of these broader critiques place blame on DoD.' 42 This section will review evidence suggesting that DoD's current role in the export licensing regime is a failure-evidence that spurred the 100th Congress to consider amending EAA section 10(g).1 4 3
A. The GAO Study on Interagency Review.
In September 1986, the GAO published a detailed study of DoD's 135. Not all standards for determining residual presidential power support President Reagan's injection of DoD into the West-West export licensing process. For example, Justice Jackson proposed to test presidential initiatives against "the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables," Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 637-i.e., with public policy analysis. involvement in the free-world export licensing process.144 The study revealed that, over the twelve-day period studied, Commerce disagreed with, and ultimately overrode, approximately two-thirds of DoD's license denial recommendations, 145 apparently claiming that the DoD recommendations lacked specificity. 1 4 6 In other cases, Commerce and DoD resolved their differences by making licenses "conditional" on reductions in the size or technical sophistication of the shipments. Even these conditional licenses were often slow in coming. 147 Other applications received a "returned without action" status-a kind of "soft rejection."' 148 The GAO report faulted both agencies for not sharing information. 149 It implied that Commerce, which looks for specific problems with a shipment before disapproving it,15o presumes approval, whereas DoD, which recommends against all shipments having certain general characteristics, 15 ' presumes disapproval. 52 The GAO concluded that efforts to improve the agencies' cooperation "should lead to greater consistency between 147. The study showed that the conditional licenses often took from six to ten weeks to process.
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 59, at 28-31. The NAS report was written by a special panel of experts from the government, the military, and industry, id. at iii-iv, who were "charged to examine the current system of U.S. and multi-authority for a wholly "balanced" system, but that "the executive branch has failed to implement the existing provisions of law in a coherent and effective manner." 156 Its report proposed a host of corrective measures, 1 57 some of which influenced the 100th Congress. 1 58
The NAS report criticized DoD's general approach to export controls, and specifically attacked DoD's role in export license review. 1 59 Because of "[tlhe exclusive DoD focus on tightening export controls without balanced input from other agencies concerning the possible economic and long-term national security consequences," it stated, "conflicts have arisen among the responsible agencies... industry has been confused and alarmed..., and allies have become annoyed ... ." ,60 The report noted that five percent of all applications take 100 days or more to process, causing huge losses to U.S. exporters. 1 6 1 The NAS suggested two reforms that bear on the section 10(g) problem: (1) firm policy guidance and mediation by the National Security Council,1 62 and (2) a reduction in DoD's role in detailed license review, coupled with an increase in Commerce's responsibilities. 163 lateral national security export controls and to seek strategies... to achieve a desirable balance among the national objectives of military security, economic vitality, and scientific and technological advance. . 53, 81-86 (1987) . Citing a number of DoD sources, Mr. Fedorowycz attacks the NAS's "decidedly pro-export approach," id. at 81, along these lines: [Vol. 1988:785 When the Transnautic blunder came to light, DoD publicly attacked Commerce, accusing it of hiding the successful license request. 1 67 These charges demonstrate DoD's fierce determination to review, and perhaps to disapprove, as many arguably "divertible" shipments as possible-an attitude characteristic of its free-world license review under EAA section 10(g). 168
D. Hearings in the Ninety-Ninth and One Hundredth Congresses.
Congress began to hear complaints about DoD free-world license review soon after it enacted the 1985 EAAA. In October 1985, a House subcommittee learned that DoD had convinced Commerce to disapprove 167. DoD Under Secretary Stephen Bryen accused Commerce of hiding National Semiconductor's application, id., even though had National Semiconductor filed an identical application three days later, Commerce would have issued a general license under a change in the EAR. See 15 C.F.R. § 376.12 (establishing "de minimis" exception to export licensing requirements for foreign goods containing 10% U.S. parts or less, subject to $10,000 maximum value per shipment). In a press briefing, an application in only one case and that DoD was responding by imposing onerous approval conditions. 169 Moreover, a Commerce official reported, DoD review adds an average of twenty days to free-world license processing times. 170 Nonetheless, a trade bill that proposed detailed study of DoD's free-world license review program 7 1 died in committee at the end of the 99th Congress. 1 72
The House introduced a new trade bill in the first days of the 100th Congress, 173 [Vol. 1988:785 of Defense for International Security Policy. Mr. Perle defended DoD's single-mindedness in export control, saying that "the trade benefits [of liberal controls] are minuscule in relation to the investment in defense that they force upon us." ' 176 He saw DoD as a source of independence from foreign and business pressures on the licensing process, and hinted that those pressures were prompting the House to silence DoD's pronational-security view. 177 In response to a written question from Senator Garn, he criticized the NAS study as "long on proposals for change but short on hard cost/benefit analysis." 178 He stressed the importance of licensing conditions and an "audit trail" for free-world exports, and decried "roller coaster legislation" that would change the status quo under the presidential directive. 179 The evidence convinced Congress of the need for change, and in mid-1987 each chamber passed a trade bill proposing an amendment to EAA section 10(g). 180 Congress acted despite lurking doubts about the wisdom of reviving the policy debate. 18 1 V.
INDECISION IN THE ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
A. The Omnibus Trade Bill Provisions.
The 100th Congress's omnibus trade bill conference faced the task of reconciling a Senate provision that proposed few changes to EAA section 10(g) 18 2 with a House provision that advocated "reaffirming the primacy of the Department of Commerce in export control matters" 1 83 through a reduction of DoD's license review authority under the section. . 3) proposed replacing the troublesome phrase "country to which exports are controlled for national security purposes" with the defined phrase "controlled country" 186 throughout section 10(g). 187 The bill went on to limit DoD's review powers to those expressly stated in the EAA.1 8 8 These two changes would have revoked any existing statutory authority for DoD's freeworld license review program 89 and would have removed any congressional imprimatur from the January 1985 presidential directive. 190 In addition, the House bill stiffened DoD's twenty-day deadline for handling licenses still within its review authority. 191 186. EAA § § 5(b)(1), 16(6), 50 U.S.C. app. § § 2404(b)(1), 2415(6) (Supp. III 1985). 187. See H.R. 3, supra note 173, § 332(n)(1), (2)(A), 133 CONG. REc. at H2685 (proposing to amend EAA § 10(g)(1), (2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
188. Id. § 332(n)(3), 133 CONG. Rac. at H2685 (proposing replacement of EAA § 10(g)(4), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g)(4) (1982), with provision limiting DoD review powers to those "provided in this subsection").
189. See supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REp. No. 100-40, supra note 98, pt. 3, at 101 (presenting House's rationale for cutting back DoD's role).
190. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text; cf supra note 120 (discussing theory that IEEPA provides statutory authority for DoD free-world license review).
191. See H.R. 3, supra note 173, § 332(n)(2)(D), 133 CONG. REC. at H2685; see also EAA § 10(g)(2), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409 power to impose conditions on export license approvals. 195 Like H.R. 3, however, the Senate amendment limited DoD's license review time to twenty days, 196 and it exhorted DoD to "carefully consider" each application that it reviews.197 Finally, section 1021 contained a provision to ensure that the President has both agencies' recommendations when he resolves a licensing dispute under EAA section 10(g)(2). 19 8 B. Agreement on the 1988 OTCA.
The House and Senate's disagreement over DoD free-world license review contributed to the slow progress of the conference committee's export controls subconference, but a heated debate over retroactive sanctions against Toshiba Corporation and Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk soon stole section 10(g)'s limelight. 199 Six months after its formation, the subconference finally arrived at a compromise on Toshiba/Kongsberg sanctions, 'raising hopes that the unwieldy task of resolving the differences between the two omnibus bills was nearing completion. 2°° The conference's agreement nearly came to naught in the spring of 1988. President Reagan vetoed the trade bill, focusing on the bill's controversial requirement that management warn workers sixty days before plant closings or long-term layoffs; 20 2 shortly thereafter, an override at-tempt narrowly failed in the Senate. 20 3 Both chambers swiftly reintroduced the same trade bill, without the plant closing provisions, as H.R. 4848 .2 04 Late in the summer, the President acquiesced in a separate plant-closing bill, and H.R. 4848 became law. 2 0 5 C. The Congressional Intent Behind Section 10(g).
Since the 1988 OTCA makes no major changes to EAA section 10(g), the OTCA and its legislative history are relevant only insofar as they help to resolve the ambiguities of section 10(g) or shed light on the congressional intent behind DoD free-world license review. 20 6 On the first score, the OTCA is useless. The conference report on the trade bill describes the Senate's position on section 10(g)(1)'s key phrase, "country to which exports are controlled for national security purposes, ' 20 7 as "no provision" (i.e., continued silence). 20 8 Moreover, the report explains, the conferees rejected the House's proposed amendment and accepted the Senate's position "without prejudice to different interpretations of the statutory authority for DoD to review exports to countries other than controlled countries." 20 9 This statement shows that the 100th Congress has recognized section 10(g)(1)'s ambiguity and has admitted its inability to resolve it.210
On the second score, proponents of DoD free-world license review might argue that the conference report, by reluctantly acknowledging "different interpretations" of section 10(g)'s meaning, 211 implies that the 1988 OTCA ratifies the Garn/Heinz interpretation. 2 12 A careful reading of all the relevant materials on the 1988 OTCA, however, suggests that Congress has not decided whether to authorize the free-world license review that the President ordered in 1985. First, the conference report discusses the President's 1985 directive as a "situation[ ] when other departments [than Commerce] are included in specific licensing decisions. ' 213 This passage in the report scrupulously avoids mentioning any connection between the Commerce/DoD M.O.U. 2 14 and EAA section 10(g).
Second, subsection 2425(b) of the 1988 OTCA demands a joint Commerce/DoD study of the "redundancy and effectiveness" of concurrent review, "to provide a factual basis in order to evaluate the effect of such joint review. ' 21 5 The language suggests that Congress will do the evaluating and that no such evaluation has yet occurred. 2 16 Finally, Congressman Bonker's unrebutted remarks during the House debate on the OTCA's conference report reiterate the report's point that Congress has not yet agreed on DoD's role in free-world export license review:
Regrettably,... an important provision of the House bill to clarify the role of the Department of Defense in reviewing exports to free world destinations is not part of this conference agreement.... [The House wanted] to clarify DOD's review of exports to controlled countries. While the conference agreement does not contain such clarification, the [House] committee reaffirms its strong belief that the statutory role of the Secretary of Defense in reviewing export licenses is limited
